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WHOOPS! THE IMMINENT RECONCILIATION OF U.S. SECURITIES
LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL COMITY AFTER MORRISON v.
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK AND THE DRAFTING
ERROR IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

At a time when the interconnectedness of global markets is as clear as
ever and governments around the world strive to mend their respective
economies, the United States has a unique opportunity to reconcile the
extraterritorial reach of its securities laws with those of other nations.' To
date, the United States' role in combating fraud beyond its borders has
been repeatedly met with disapproval by foreign governments and businesses.2 Indeed, foreign governments often have their own devices in
1. See G-20, Declaration:Summit on FinancialMarkets and the World Economy 1 8
(Nov. 15, 2008) [hereinafter G-20 Declaration], available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/g20 summitdeclaration.pdf (declaring, in response to global economic crisis in 2008, that while "[r]egulation is first and foremost the responsibility
of national regulators who constitute the first line of defense against market instability," such "[r]egulators must ensure that their actions ... avoid potentially adverse impacts on other countries" due to global scope of current financial
markets); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
ConflictingRequirements Imposed on MultinationalEnterprises(June 1991) [hereinafter
OECD], availableat http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_34887
1933081_1_1_1_1,00.html (adopting considerations and practical approaches
"with the aim of avoiding or minimising the imposition of conflicting requirements on multinational enterprises by governments," and promoting cooperation
between Member nations); see also Brief for Org. for Int'l Inv. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at *8, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010) (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 719335 [hereinafter Org. for Int'l Inv. Amicus Br.]
(arguing that Court should "continue to fulfill America's obligations to the international community" by not applying U.S. law "to claims of foreign plaintiffs based
upon conduct by foreign companies"); Brief for U.K of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at *24, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 081191), 2010 WL 723009 [hereinafter UK Amicus Br.] ("Expansive extraterritorial
application of the Rule 10b-5 private right of action risks undermining the kind of
global regulatory cooperation that the current economic situation demands and
the G-20 calls for."); Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L.
REv. 327, 327 (2010) ("The unprecedented scope of the current financial crisis has
exposed the enormous risk that can arise with the cross-border sale of securities.");
Nick S. Dhesi, Note, The Conman and the Shenff SECJurisdictionand the Role of Offshore FinancialCenters, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1345, 1346 (2010) ("As the recent financial
crisis again demonstrates, the effects of adverse market conditions in one nation
can cause unforeseeable damage across the world.").
2. See Org. for Int'l Inv. Amicus Br., supra note 1, at *8 ("Other nationsincluding many of America's closest allies-regularly have objected to extraterritorial applications of U.S. law [governing securities fraud]."); Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent
Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 523,
523-24 (1993) (noting "costly" U.S. approach toward extraterritorial application
"has offended the sovereignty of other countries which have reacted by passing
retaliatory legislation of their own"); Scott M. Himes, The Supreme Court Limits
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place to address and remedy unlawful conduct in the securities arenadevices refined according to the particular policy interests of those nations.3 The United States, however, has continually overlooked these legitimate policy concerns in its attempts to regulate predominantly foreign
conduct under domestic law.' Fortunately, despite such insular tendenTransnational Securities Fraud Cases, 79 U.S.L.W. 1090 (July 7, 2010) (noting that
foreign application of Section 10(b) is "deemed very intrusive abroad" because
"'plaintiff friendly'" courts in U.S. subject foreign parties to "more costly and onerous procedures than judicial proceedings in their own countries"); John D. Kelly,
Note, Let There Be Fraud(Abroad): A Proposalfor a New U.S.Jurisprudencewith Regard to
the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Anti-Fraud Provisionsof the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 477 (1997) ("Internationally, issuers and sellers have been unwittingly held to U.S. standards in foreign issuances and sales, and
nation-states have balked at the 'arrogance' with which U.S. courts have exercised
jurisdiction over behavior that they consider to be solely within their sovereign
domains.").
3. See Microsoft v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (applying assumption that Congress drafts legislation with "'legitimate sovereign interests of other
nations'" in mind, and emphasizing fact that "foreign law 'may embody different
policy judgments"' (citation omitted)); cf F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (holding that application of U.S. antitrust
law to foreign conduct, causing foreign harm that gives rise to claim, "creates a
serious risk of interference with a foreign nation's ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs"); Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167 ("[E]ven where nations agree about primary

conduct . . . they disagree dramatically

about

appropriate remedies."); Sarah L. Cave, F-Cubed=O: Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2010, at 4 (noting that foreign
governments urged Morrison Court, in interpreting extraterritorial application of
Section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to acknowledge policy considerations of "(1) the sovereignty of other nations; (2) the development of sophisticated regulation of the issuance and trading of securities within numerous
markets; (3) the globalization of capital markets; (4) the increasing interdependence of national economies; and (5) the principles of comity and international
relations"); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality
ofAmerican SecuritiesLaw, 17 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 208 (1996) ("Extraterritoriality results in frequent conflicts between the United States and other nations.");
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition ofJudgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1065, 1117
(2002) ("Extraterritorial application of law has become worrisome to many observers because it interferes with sovereign authority by limiting the extent to which a
State can control the local conditions . . . ."); Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a
Multisectored FinancialServices Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319,
379 (1999) ("Exercising jurisdiction over foreign transactions is costly and difficult; moreover, in many jurisdictions it will be redundant if foreign regulatory
structures also govern the transactions and are effectively enforced.").
4. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 572 (noting that U.S. courts are unlikely to pay
due regard to foreign interests when facing decision between applying U.S. law
and declining to do so out of deference to those interests); cf id. at 540-41 (noting
SEC's position with respect to foreign tender offers is that U.S. law presumptively
applies "so long as the offer is conducted in or has an effect in the United States").
See generally Gregory K. Matson, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over
TransnationalSecurities Fraud,79 GEO. L.J. 141 (1990) (arguing that "judicial activism" in applying U.S. securities laws extraterritorially should be curtailed to more
sensible approach that "addresses the concerns of the expanding international legal and financial communities").
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cies, the current regulatory climate provides an avenue through which the
extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws can
be moderated to reflect international comity.5
The U.S. Supreme Court took an important step in curtailing the foreign application of these antifraud provisions in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.6 Specifically, the Court devised a new transactional test for
applying Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) to foreign transactions and, in doing so, narrowed the potential body
of litigation in this field.7 In adopting this new test, the Court overruled
the substantial body of U.S. Courts of Appeals case law that relied on the
broader "conduct and effects" tests, or variations thereon, developed and
refined by the Second Circuit.8 Under the new transactional test, Section
10(b), along with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5,
only grants a private right of action to foreign plaintiffs when the transaction at issue occurs in the United States, or when the transaction, if it takes
place abroad, involves a security listed on a U.S. exchange. 9
5. For a discussion of how the foreign reach of the antifraud provisions of the
U.S. securities laws has been moderated, see infra notes 107-62 and accompanying
text.
6. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
7. See Cave, supra note 3 (concluding that Morrison decision will lessen
"[p]otential for liability both in private civil actions and regulatory proceedings ...
and the corresponding costs of litigation"); Himes, supra note 2 ("There will be
fewer securities-fraud cases involving foreign investors or foreign issuers in the future, since the transactional test of Morrisonaffords less leeway to bring these cases
in the U.S. than under the conduct-and-effects test.").
8. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-81 (rejecting Second Circuit's approach of
interpreting what Congress intended by weighing conduct and effects occurring in
U.S. on case-by-case basis rather than applying statutory presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction). The Court reasoned that "[t]he results ofjudicial-speculation-made-law-divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the
situation before the court-demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption
in all cases . . . ." Id. at 2881.
9. See id. at 2888 ("Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security
listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.").
Because of the scope of the Morrison Court's holding, this Note shall focus
largely on Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5; the discussion of the reach of these provisions and international reaction to them, however, may extend to other antifraud
provisions within the U.S. securities laws as their language permits. See Kellye Y.
Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Security Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L.
REV. 927, 927 n.5 (1994) (limiting article's scope to Rule lOb-5, but noting that
analysis may be applied to "other antifraud remedies under the 1933 Act, see, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, (1988), or under the 1934 Act, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n,
78t (1988) [,] ... where the specific language of the particular antifraud provision
does not perforce confine the globalization issue"). Indeed, Congress seems to
adopt this rationale in its attempt to broaden the reach of all antifraud provisions
under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Investment
Advisers Act of 1940. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864-65 (2010) [hereinaf-
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Nearly one month after the Court's Mornison decision, President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, more commonly known as the "Dodd-Frank Act."10
Hailed as the sweeping reform needed to remedy the country's economic
woes and strengthen consumer protections, the Dodd-Frank Act does little

to clarify the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities fraud laws." Specifically, the Act fails to expand the geographic enforcement capabilities of
the SEC or the Department of Justice (DOJ) under U.S. securities laws.12
Instead, it merely defines the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases
brought by those agencies and charges the SEC with the task of soliciting
public comment as to the extraterritorial application of such laws in private rights of action.'1

ter Dodd-Frank Act] ("Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Antifraud Provisions of
the Federal Securities Laws").
10. 124 Stat. 1376.
11. See Memorandum from George T. Conway III, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, Extraterritorialityof the Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank:Partly
Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged (July 21, 2010),
available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritorialityafter-dodd-frank (concluding that Dodd-Frank Act provisions 929(b) and 929Y
concerning antifraud provisions of federal securities laws do not "overturn [Morrison], and neither should extend the substantive reach of the securities laws extraterritorially at all"). Notably, George T. Conway, III served as Counsel of Record
on behalf of the respondents in Morrison. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869 (listing
counsel of record).
12. Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws," adds the following
provision to Section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)), Section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78aa), and Section 214 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80b-14):
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.-The district courts of the
United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have
jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this title involving(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable
substantial effect within the United States.
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864-65. For a discussion of why Section 929P(b) does not
expand the extraterritorial reach of the SEC or DOJ, see infra, notes 107-62 and
accompanying text.
13. Section 929Y, entitled "Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action,"
states:
(a) IN GENERAL.-The Securities and Exchange Commission of the
United States shall solicit public comment and thereafter conduct a study
to determine the extent to which private rights of action under the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78u-4) should be extended to cover(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes a significant step in
the furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; and
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This Note argues that the Supreme Court in Morrison properly applied the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes that
are silent on the issue.' 4 It also contends that the Court appropriately
recognized the rule of construction of avoiding statutory interpretations
that would interfere with the territorial sovereignty of other nations.' 5 Because of this decision, international market participants will likely ease
their perceptions of the United States as an imperialist in securities law, at
least insofar as private rights of action are concerned. 16 Nonetheless, due
to a drafting error in the Dodd-Frank Act that framed the extraterritorial
reach of the antifraud provisions as a jurisdictional statute, Morrison inadvertently extends beyond private rights of action to encompass SEC and
DOJ enforcement actions. 1 7
Part II of this Note overviews the foreign application of U.S. securities
laws, including international reactions to the pre-Morrison approach and
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable
substantial effect within the United States.
(b) CONTENTS.-The study shall consider and analyze, among other
things(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it
should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more limited
to extend just to institutional investors or otherwise;
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on international comity;
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action
for transnational securities frauds; and
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be adopted.
(c) REPORT.-A report of the study shall be submitted and recommendations made to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House not
later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
§ 929Y, 124 Stat. at 1871.
14. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78 (invoking presumption against extraterritorial application and concluding, "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of
an extraterritorial application, it has none").
15. See id. at 2892 ("It is true, of course, that 'this Court ordinarily construes
ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations."' (quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542
U.S. 155, 164 (2004))). In Empagran, the Court justified its holding by noting that
"[t]his rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law." Empagran,542 U.S. at 164; see also Corffu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 35
(Apr. 9) ("Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw § 403(a) (1987) ("[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state
when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.").
16. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886 (addressing "fear that [U.S.] has become
the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly
cheated in foreign securities markets").
17. For a discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act and its implications on the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antifraud provisions, see infra notes 107-72 and
accompanying text.
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18
Part
discussions of the principle of comity and of the need for reform.
III examines the conduct and effects tests employed prior to the Morrison
decision. This Part also details the facts of Morrison and evaluates the
Court's application of the statutory presumption against extraterritoriality
19
Part IV then sumand the new transactional test set forth in its holding.
marizes the Dodd-Frank Act as it relates to the extraterritorial application
20
of the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws.

In light of this examination, Part V argues that the Dodd-Frank Act
21
The Doddfails to achieve its desired result because of drafter oversight.
Frank Act attempts to statutorily delineate the reach of both the SEC and
22
the United States by defining the jurisdiction of federal district courts.
Many commentators assume that the Dodd-Frank Act grants the SEC and
23
These early
DOJ jurisdiction to apply U.S. antifraud provisions abroad.
interpretations, however, overlook the well-settled law that jurisdictional
statutes do not define the rights or obligations of a party, but speak only to
the power of a court to hear a case. 24 Part VI asserts that, with a report on
the extraterritorial reach of private rights of actions due in January 2012,
the SEC can contract U.S. securities laws to a more appropriate level
within the international economic system. 25 Finally, Part VII concludes by
summarizing the current reach of the antifraud provisions, and emphasizing the need to maintain international comity when construing the Dodd26
Frank Act in the wake of Morrison.
18. For a further discussion of foreign applicability of U.S. securities laws, see
infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the Court's approach to extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, see infra notes 61-106 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act's specific treatment of extraterritoriality, see infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the drafting errors in the Dodd-Frank Act, see
infra notes 111-62 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the statutory language of the Dodd-Frank Act,
see supra note 11-13 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Hath Morrison' Wrought?, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
16, 2010, at 5 (concluding that Dodd-Frank Act precludes extension of Morrison
holding to SEC and DOJ enforcement actions); Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C.
Hamilton, The Long Arm of the Law: Morrison, Dodd-Frank, and the Extraterritorial
Reach of U.S. Regulators, SEC. L. DAILY, (BNA) (Oct. 4, 2010) ("The Dodd-Frank Act
appears to codify the earlier 'conduct and effects' test, at least in cases brought by
the SEC and United States."); Thomas 0. Gorman, Dodd-Frank: New Authority for
SEC Enforcement, http://www.secactions.com/?p=2403 (last visited Sept. 24, 2010)
(same); Allens Arthur Robinson, Focus: US Courts'ExtraterritorialReach in Securities
FraudCases Reinstated, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/ldr/focsraug10.
htm (same).
24. For a discussion of the scope of jurisdictional statutes, see infra notes 11535 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of how U.S. securities laws can be harmonized with the
international economic system, see infra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the importance of international comity in securities
law enforcement, see infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
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II.

A HORNET AMONG FLYSWATTERS: U.S. SECURITIES LAWS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

The extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws often interferes
with foreign attempts to regulate the same conduct.2 7 This practice aggravates many foreign governments with interests in such regulation as well as
foreign businesses that fear subjection to U.S. judgments. 28 To reverse
this troubling trend and uphold its obligations under international law,
the United States should place greater emphasis on cooperative efforts to
29
regulate securities fraud and moderate its reach abroad.
A.

A Snapshot of the ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Securities Laws

The number of federal securities class action filings and government
enforcement actions has recently decreased due to the sharp decline in
claims resulting from the economic crisis.3 0 The SEC has reported that, in
2009, sixty-eight securities class actions involved issuer reporting and disclosure, down from eighty-one in 2008.31 The SEC brought seventy-five
administrative proceedings under this same category, only one less than in
2008.32 Nevertheless, the litigation and enforcement landscape in the
27. For a discussion of the conflict between U.S. and foreign securities regulation, see infra notes 4043 and accompanying text.
28. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 477 ("Internationally, issuers and sellers have
been unwittingly held to U.S. standards in foreign issuances and sales, and nationstates have balked at the 'arrogance' with which U.S. courts have exercised jurisdiction over behavior that they consider to be solely within their sovereign
domains.").
29. For a discussion of how the U.S. should limit its unilateral international
securities law enforcement activities, see infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
30. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLAss ACTION FILINGs: 2010 MIDYEAR ASSESSMENT 3-4 (2010), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearing
housejresearch/2010YIR/CornerstoneResearchFilings_2010.MidYearAssessment.pdf (noting how securities class action filings have decreased from 212 in
2008, to 168 in 2009, to 71 in first half of 2010 due "to several factors, including a
severe drop-off in filings associated with the recent credit crisis and the absence of
any filings related to the Madoff fraud and other Ponzi schemes that occurred in
2009"); see also GRACE LAMONT & PATRICIA A. ETZOLD, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 35 (2010), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/
(noting that
PDF/NY-10-0559%20SEC%20LIT%20STUDY_.V7%20PRINT.PDF
class actions filed against foreign issuers declined from all-time high of thirty-six in
2008 to twenty in 2009).

31. Compare SEC.

AND EXCH. COMM'N, SELECT

SEC

AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL

2009, at 3, http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2009.pdf (summarizing 2009 enforcement actions) with SEC. AND ExcH. COMM'N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA:
FISCAL 2008, at 3, http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2008.pdf (summarizing 2008
enforcement actions).
32. For a discussion of SEC enforcement actions in 2008 and 2009, see supra
note 31 and accompanying text. See also lAmoNT & ETzOLD, supra note 30, at 26-27
(noting that federal securities class actions involving either SEC or DOJ have
dropped from seventy-six cases in 2006 to twenty-eight in 2009).
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United States continues to influence (and in many instances, interfere
33
with) international regulatory initiatives.
The extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities
34
Section
laws is governed byjudicial interpretations of the Exchange Act.
10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,... any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance . . . ."35 Rule 10b-5, which the SEC
promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b), identifies the specific fraudulent
conduct rendered unlawful by the Exchange Act.3 6 Under both provi33. See European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Defining the Collective Actions Systems and Its Role in the
Context of Community Consumer Law, 2008 O.J. (C 162) 2 (rejecting "US-style 'class
actions'," because they are incompatible with European "traditions and principles"
and promote "particularly harmful" practice of compensating "third party investors and lawyers" with "substantial share of sums won as compensation or punitive
damages"); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 872
(2006) (noting that SEC is both "widely acclaimed" and "forcefully criticized" as it
"is among the most influential regulatory agencies in the world"); cf Testy, supra
note 9, at 927 ("Not only are the United States securities laws committed to fighting fraud in domestic transactions, the broad jurisdictional reach of those laws
threatens to seek out and destroy fraud (American style) worldwide."); Brandy L.
Fulkerson, Note, Extraterritorialjurisdiction and U.S. Securities Law: Seeking Limits for
Application of the 10(b) and 10b-5 Antifraud Provisions, 92 Ky. L.J. 1051, 1051 (2004)
(noting that U.S. is "attractive forum" for bringing securities fraud claims because
it provides "substantive remedies and procedural devices, such as the class action.
that are unavailable in many foreign states, and deference to plaintiff autonomy").
34. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903, 912 (1998)
("[S]ection 10(b)'s scope has been left to the courts, which have grappled with the
issue of extraterritoriality on a case-by-case basis.").
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1996), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a

material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
Courts recognized that both Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 include an implied private right of action, and Congress "imposed statutory requirements on that private
action" in 1998. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). The
elements of such private right of action are:
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission);
(2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind;
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities markets
(fraud-on-the-market cases) as "transaction causation";
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sions, fraudulent conduct must be carried out "by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange." 37 Against this legislative backdrop and
in the absence of direction from the Supreme Court, U.S. courts have long
grappled with the issue of whether, and to what extent, these provisions
apply to non-U.S. parties and to occurrences abroad.3 8 The courts have
adopted different standards depending on the circumstances being litigated and, as a result, have proved to be dynamic forums for international
39
parties to challenge the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
These parties have expressed their disapproval of transnational regulation under U.S. law by citing an array of rationale. 40 Most prominent
(5) economic loss; and
(6) "loss causation," i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.
Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341-42 (citations omitted).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
38. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under FederalSecurities
Law: ManagingJurisdictionalConflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 19-20 (2007)
(noting that while it is "broadly accepted" that antifraud provisions have some extraterritorial application, defining "[p]recisely which transactions or conduct are
covered remains a matter ofjudicial interpretation"); Derek N. White, Note, Conduct and Effects: Reassessing the Protection of Foreign Investorsfrom InternationalSecurities
Fraud,22 REGENT U. L. REv. 81, 86 (2010) (stating "lower courts have had to determine whether 'Congress would have wished the precious resources of U.S. courts
and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to' . . . predominantly foreign transactions rather than allowing foreign nations to deal with the problem," because statute is silent as to extraterritorial reach and Supreme Court has not addressed issue
(quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975), overruled by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010))).
39. For example, in response to the Morrison litigation, eighteen amicus curiae briefs were submitted in total, with fifteen of them supporting the respondents
and the bright-line test eventually adopted by the Court. See, e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d
at 996-97 (noting that Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France all submitted declarations stating that they "would not recognize a U.S. judgment in favor of the defendant as a bar to an action by [their] own citizens").
40. The amicus briefs filed in the Morrison case shed light on the range and
intensity of arguments against the foreign application of U.S. laws. See, e.g., Br. for
Eur. Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. N.V. as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resp'ts at
*9-12, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 719336 [hereinafter Eur.
Aero. Defence & Space Co. Amici Br.] (arguing that Congress never expressed
'clear intent" to have Section 10(b) apply abroad); Br. of Int'l Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resp'ts at *18-29, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No.
08-1191), 2010 WL 719334 [hereinafter ICC Amici Br.] (arguing that Court should
accord comity to foreign law when interpreting Section 10(b), citing numerous
foreign regulatory frameworks addressing securities fraud); Org. for Int'l Inv. Amicus Br., supra note 1, at *12-19 (arguing that "case-by-case approach" adopted by
lower courts creates confusion and is contrary to Supreme Court precedent, thus
creating risk of deterred foreign investment in U.S.); UK Amicus Br., supra note 1,
at *6-12 (discussing UK law pertaining to securities regulation, including disclosure requirements, enforcement parameters, and procedural rules). International
parties have used the litigation process as a forum to denounce the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law long before the Morrisoncase as well. See, e.g., F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167-68 (2004) (citing amicus briefs
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among these are arguments evincing comity concerns and asserting that
the United States, by applying its securities laws abroad, is acting in a manner inconsistent with its international legal duties. 41 These protests have
not been limited to litigators, but have also been expressed by foreign governments that have voiced their discontent and have even enacted retaliatory legislation in response to U.S. assertions of transnational
jurisdiction. 4 2 Thus, the need for refining the U.S. approach to securities
filed by Germany, Canada, and Japan in presenting argument that extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws interferes with foreign regulatory regimes); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16-17
(1963) (reasoning that assertion of power to foreign conduct "aroused vigorous
protests from foreign governments and created international problems for our
Government" in holding that National Labor Relations Act does not apply where
foreign flag vessels employ foreign sailors).
41. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885-86 (reasoning that adoption of transactional test will avoid "probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of
other countries," and citing as support numerous amicus briefs filed by international parties, which "all complain of the interference with foreign securities regulation that application of § 10(b) abroad would produce"). See generally ICC Amici
Br., supra note 40, at *21-29 (arguing that foreign regulatory regimes are sufficient
to address and remedy securities violations, summarizing regulatory frameworks in
Switzerland, Germany, and France as support); Eur. Aero. Defence & Space Co.
Amici Br., supra note 40, at *16-33 (summarizing European Union securities regulation framework and those of its member nations, and discussing conflicts with
U.S. class action system). The Supreme Court defined international comity as "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
42. See, e.g., Foreign Extra-territorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29, § 5(1)
(2001) (Can.) (granting Attorney General authority to prohibit compliance with
foreign judgment that infringes Canada's sovereignty); Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, c. 11, §§ 1-2 (U.K.) (prohibiting courts from enforcing foreign
judgment that "infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise
prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom"); Michael A. Gerstenzang,
Note, Insider Trading and the Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 27 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 409, 483 (1989) (discussing French blocking statute, Law No. 80538 ofJuly 16, 1980, JournalOfficiel de la RipubliqueFranraise[J.O.] [Official Gazette
of France],July 17, 1980, p. 1799, and noting that it "forbids nationals, and certain
others with ties to France, from divulging economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters to foreign authorities except as provided by international
agreement"); see also Embassy of Switz. in the United States of America, Diplomatic
Note to the United States Dep't of State, Note No. 17/2010 (Feb. 23, 2010), reprinted in ICC Amici Br., supra note 40, at *la-4a (drawing attention to then-pending Morrison case, and stating that "[t]he extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction
requested by the plaintiffs in this case would be inconsistent with established principles of international law").
Interestingly, the U.S. government has also vigorously protested the extraterritorial application of foreign law and threatened retaliation, at least in the context
of human rights. See Org. for Int'l Inv. Amicus Br., supra note 1, at *11 (discussing
U.S. reaction to attempts by Belgium and Spain to have laws applied to human
right claims). Former Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, in response to
Belgium's assertion of its laws, stated that "Belgium appears not to respect the
sovereignty of other countries. [It] needs to realize that there are consequences to
its actions." Id. (quoting Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at
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regulation is ever-present-particularly in light of the growing interconnectedness between markets-and due regard must be paid to foreign interests accordingly. 4 3
B.

Retreat!: MaintainingInternationalPosture Through
Cooperation and Comity

Courts have addressed the issue of the antifraud laws' extraterritorial
application through a variety of different lenses and methodologies, but a
common theme-that is, a common reservation-can be discerned from
the common law vernacular. 44 A constant, unwavering appreciation of the
sovereignty of other nations lines the case law that informs U.S. legislation
invoked to address foreign circumstances. 45 Prior to Morrison and the
NATO Headquarters (June 12, 2003)), available at http://www.defense.gov/
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=469). Belgium ultimately repealed its universal
jurisdiction, as did Spain after the United States and other countries pressured it
do so. See id. (citing AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Spanish Lawmakers Move to Curb Foreign
Human Rights Probes, THE RAw STORY, May 19, 2009, http://rawstory.com/08/?p=
4584).
43. See Michael Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 1372 PLI/CoRP. 817, 825 (2009) ("In today's global
marketplace cross-border securities transactions have become routine: firms and
investors frequently undertake activities in one jurisdiction that impact the laws
and regulations of other jurisdictions."); Matson, supra note 4, at 166 (noting that
"principle of comity creates the foundation of the international legal system");
Testy, supra note 9, at 929 (arguing that SEC efforts to have U.S. securities laws
apply abroad should be governed by "comity and cooperation"); Note, Predictability
and Comity: Toward Common Principles of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,98 HARv. L. REv.
1310, 1320 (1985) ("[T]he nature and intensity of the United States' interest in
regulating extraterritorial conduct cannot alone determine the proper limits on
extraterritorial jurisdiction.").
44. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(noting "substantial degree of doctrinal ambiguity and division that exists in the
governing legal rules and precedents" that "confound[s] the courts' subject matter
jurisdiction determination in claims regarding foreign securities transactions");
Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, TransnationalLitigation and Global Securities
Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465, 467-68 (2009) (noting that courts address extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws differently, listing as examples use of conduct and effects tests, "concepts of reasonableness or other
doctrines to consider the relative efficiency and desirability of extending jurisdiction abroad"); see also Kun Young Chang, MultinationalEnforcement of U.S. Securities
Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope ofExtraterritorialSubject-Matterjurisdiction, 9 FORDI-AM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 119-20 (2003) (arguing that "courts are illsuited to the task of resolving the overlapping legal, economic, and political concerns involved in the [extraterritorial] application of antifraud rules" because of
"institutional constraints"). See generally Buxbaum, supra note 38 (examining different doctrines courts employ to interpret whether jurisdiction exists, such as conduct and effects tests, class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
subject-matter jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and international comity);
White, supra note 38, at 87-101 (same). For a discussion of the conduct and effects
tests, see infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993)
(holding comity concerns are appropriate considerations in adjudicating claims
brought under Sherman Act, but only after conclusion that court has jurisdiction
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Dodd-Frank Act, this case-by-case identification of foreign interests represented no more than a tool courts used to determine whether adjudicating
a matter would conflict with the interests of foreign sovereignties. 46
The international economic system has also recognized the need for a
more unified regulatory effort to curtail instances of securities fraud taking place across a number of global markets. 4 7 Even the U.S. government,
to act); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (adopting
"general and almost universal rule [ ] that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done," and reasoning that rule guards against interference with sovereign authority of other nations (citations omitted)); Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615,
618-19 (2d Cir. 1991) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus because district
court was justified in determining that certified copy of foreign conviction sufficed
as probable cause to extradite and reasoning that to hold otherwise inquiries
would have to be made that are "inconsistent with principles of comity");
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440, 444 (3d
Cir. 1971) (granting deference to English adjudication of breach of contract claim
under rationale that "comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would
be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect"
(citation and footnote omitted)); Paraschos v. YBM Magnex Int'l, Inc., 130 F.
Supp. 2d 642, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (dismissing securities fraud claims due to international comity concerns).
46. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 566 ("In addition to considering the interests of
the United States in applying its law to foreign tender offers, the courts must,
under an interest analysis approach, consider the interests of other sovereigns in
regulating the transaction."); Matson, supra note 4, at 148 ("Courts . . . face a situation in which they must resolve the cases before them by weighing the domestic
and foreign aspects of a particular case to determine the appropriateness of applying the securities laws.").
47. See International Organization of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], MultilateralMemorandum of UnderstandingConcerning Consultation and Cooperation and the
Exchange of Information, May 2002, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pub
docs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf (stating purpose of establishing cooperative multilateral agreement to address "increasing international activity in the securities and
derivatives markets, and the corresponding need for mutual cooperation and consultation among IOSCO Members to ensure compliance with, and enforcement of,
their securities and derivatives laws and regulations); Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalizationof Securities Regulation: The United States' Role in Regulatingthe Global Capital Markets, 5J. Bus. & TECH. L. 187, 193-97 (2010) (arguing that "[t]he best model
for international securities regulation is one based upon regulatory harmonization
and centralization"); Charles V. Baltic, III, Note, The Next Step in Insider Trading
Regulation: International Cooperative Efforts in the Global Securities Market, 23 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 167, 192-97 (1992) (arguing that "future of effective regulation in
[international securities markets] depends not on extraterritorial exertion of national jurisdiction but rather on cooperative regulatory efforts," and offering European Economic Community Directive on Insider Trading as example in area of
insider trading); cf G-20 Declaration, supra note 1, at 9 (calling upon "regulators
to formulate their regulations and other measures in a consistent manner" and
making it priority to "strengthen cooperation"); OECD, supra note 1 (stating that
"[m]ember countries should endeavour to promote co-operation as an alternative
to unilateral action to avoid or minimise conflicting requirements and problems
arising therefrom"); Christopher M. Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: PublicPrivateRegulatory Regimes in an Era ofEconomic Globalization,30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 125,
171 (2008) ("The push for cooperative regimes has been particularly strong in the
economic arena."). See generally Ahdieh, supra note 33 (arguing for international
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in a variety of contexts, acknowledges the value of increasing cooperation
between countries to create more effective regulatory controls.4 8 Such an
effort would not only likely prove more effective than domestic actions,
but would also minimize intrusions by one country into the regulatory interests of another.4 9 Only if the constituents in the global system cooperate, however, would this system operate efficiently-without such
cooperation, market players would simply flock to those areas not "playing
along" and the "race-to-the-bottom" trend that many commentators identify would continue. 50
regulatory system encouraging jurisdictional "overlap, interdependence, and attendant complexity" so that regulators may cooperate and compete to achieve effective global regime); Brummer, supra note 1 (discussing obstacles and solutions
to international cooperation among regulators in securities regulation); Mann &
Barry, supra note 43 (discussing developments in internationalization of securities
regulation); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, TransnationalRegulatory Networks and TheirLimits, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 113 (2009) (discussing efficacy of "transnational regulatory
networks").
48. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM-A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 4 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport web.pdf (stating
one of five objectives is to "[r]aise international regulatory standards and improve
international cooperation"); SEC. AND EXcH. COMM'N, InternationalRegulatory Policy,
Jan. 20, 2010, http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-regpolicy.shtml (last visited
Sept. 17, 2010) (stating that regulatory priorities include "facilitating regulatory
cooperation regarding the supervision of financial entities active in the cross-border capital markets").
The SEC has also yielded to other nations when discontinuing enforcement
proceedings, thus recognizing the need to harmonize efforts and defer to primarily foreign interests in curtailing international securities fraud. See, e.g., Gregory
Crouch, Ahold Reaches a Settlement with the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 2004, at C1
(stating that SEC ceased to pursue securities fraud charges out of deference to
Dutch prosecutors); Parmalat Settles with S.E.C. on Accusations of Bond Sale Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at C8 (noting that SEC deferred to Italian bankruptcy
proceedings, requiring only that Parmalat "put in effect internal governance reforms to settle a civil fraud suit filed by [SEC]").
49. Cf Predictability and Comity, supra note 43, at 1322 ("When the United
States asserts jurisdiction over activities occurring within the territory of another
sovereign, its action may well be perceived as intrusive and perhaps even unlawful."). One commentator has suggested that "optimal deterrence" is best achieved
through a cooperative global regime rather than a unilateral approach boasting
harsher penalties, at least in the antitrust context. See Siddharth Fernandes, Note,
F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran and the ExtraterritorialLimits of United States
Antitrust jurisdiction: Where Comity and Deterrence Collide, 20 CONN. J. INT'L L. 267,
304-05, 316-17 (2005) (arguing that Supreme Court's decision in Empagran S.A.
supports theory that "[i]n today's global economy and in an environment where
unilateral action has proven to be both counterproductive and insulting, nations
must cooperate to forge an effective antitrust regime").
50. See W. Barton Patterson, Note, Defining the Reach of the Securities Exchange
Act: ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 213,
229 (2005) (noting "fear" among some commentators that if securities fraud regulation is left to individual nations, "regulatory competition will cause nations to
draft progressively weaker securities laws in an attempt to attract corporations, creating a downward spiral" as corporations will seek "weaker investor protections");
see also Chaffee, supra note 47, at 194 (noting that, even if "race-to-the-bottom" is
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In addition to establishing an international regulatory regime, the
United States has a number of alternative avenues through which it could
cooperate in curtailing international securities fraud at an appropriate
level. 51 Already in place are Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and foreign parties. 52 These memoranda aim to
facilitate the type of information exchanges needed to combat cross-border securities fraud as well as to encourage the cooperation necessary in
respecting the sovereign rights of other nations.5 3 MOUs have been critiavoided by establishing transnational norms, it may not be fully preventable due to
gaps between regulation and likelihood of enforcement among different
countries).
Some commentators argue that regulatory competition or disparity between
nations actually induces a "race-to-the-top" scenario, reasoning that investors place
a premium on reliable information. See Patterson, supra note 50, at 229 (noting
that "other commentators believe that the market will value securities lower when
they are subject to minimal investor protections, so corporations will not select
weak securities regimes"); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2426-27 (1998) ("The supporting
evidence against the race-for-the-bottom thesis . . . is that firms the world over
voluntarily release more information than their securities regulators require in order to raise capital, with the best example being the European firms listing in
London, which voluntarily choose to meet higher local disclosure requirements.").
51. See Chaffee, supra note 47, at 202 (discussing current SEC "initiatives to
increase cooperation and coordination," such as "provid [ing] assistance to foreign
securities regulators in cross-border securities investigations and prosecutions,"
agreeing to "memorand [a] of understanding ... to allow for the sharing of information," participating in various international regulatory organizations, "engaging
in a number of bilateral dialogues," and "exploring the use of International Financial Reporting Standards and the possible convergence of those international standards with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States"). After
analyzing the current U.S. regulatory framework, Chaffee presented three proposals to push the United States toward a more cooperative and harmonized approach towards securities regulation, reasoning that action should be taken "while
it has the power to lead the process, rather than be a mere contributor." Id. at 20506. To help establish the centralized securities regulatory body needed to be effective in today's globalized economy, he posited that:
First, the United States should convene a successor organization to
IOSCO with more robust monitoring powers and an international task

force to regularly report on issues facing the emerging global capital mar-

kets. Second, the United States should spearhead the creation of an international agreement on the regulation of securities and exchanges that
sets basic regulatory norms for national securities markets throughout the
world from which nations could upwardly depart if desired. Third, the
United States should begin a discussion regarding how to bring a global
securities and exchange regulator into being.
Id. at 205.
52. See SEC. AND ExcH. COMM'N, CooperativeArrangements with Foreign Regulators,
June 11, 2010, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-cooparrangements.
shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (identifying five areas of cooperative arrangements
established via MOU's and entered into by SEC, including Enforcement Cooperation, Regulatory Cooperation, Technical Assistance, Terms of Reference for Bilateral Dialogues, and Mutual Recognition).
53. Cf SEC. AND ExcH. COMM'N, The SEC's CooperativeArrangements with Foreign
Regulators, May 23, 2008, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-coopfact
sheet.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010) ("MOUs establish clear mechanisms for the
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cized, however, as ineffective due to their nonbinding nature, the amount
of time required for negotiation, and the fact that foreign regulators must
54
first seek assistance if the SEC is to get involved.
Whatever the means employed, international law binds the United
States to respect the sovereignty of other governments, and, consequently,
55
the United States must not exert influences contrary to such an end.
exchange of information, including setting forth the terms and conditions for
sharing and protecting the confidentiality of non-public information.").
54. See Dhesi, supra note 1, at 1371-73 (arguing that despite SEC publicity to
contrary, MOUs, its "main method of expanding its jurisdiction to foreign soil,"
remains "insufficient mechanisms").
55. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Lauren, 345 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1953) (holding that
Jones Act does not have extraterritorial application in circumstances involving foreign ship in foreign waters under rationale that statutes silent as to their foreign
application are "construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international
law"); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.)
631 (U.K.) (determining that United States' "exercise ofjurisdiction" over foreign
conduct "is not in accordance with international law"); Rb. The Hague 17 September 1982, RvdW 1982, 167 m.nt. (Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A./Sensor Nederland B.V.), translated in 22 I.L.M. 66, 71-73 (1982) (holding that United
States may not bring foreign corporation within its extraterritorial jurisdiction
through imposition of trade embargo, as doing so would violate "universally accepted rule of international law that in general it is not permissible for a State to
exercise jurisdiction over acts performed outside its borders" unless nationality,
protection, or universality principle exceptions apply, which they do not); Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244, at 35 (Apr. 9) ("Between independent
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations."); S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept.
7) ("Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule-it may not exercise its
power in any form in the territory of another State."). The Lotus court determined
that under this principle of international law, "jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it
cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive
rule derived from international custom or from a convention." S.S. "Lotus," 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19; see alsoJohn H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality,104 Am. J. Ircr'L L. 351, 356 (2010) ("The most important basis
for jurisdiction is territory: each state undoubtedly has legislative jurisdiction over
events taking place and persons found within its own territory, and territory is
often called the normal or primary basis for jurisdiction.").
The principle that sovereignty guides international obligations was carefully
explained in Island of Palmas:
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The
development of the national organisation of States during the last few
centuries and, as a corollary, the development of international law, have
established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure
in settling most questions that concern international relations. The special cases of the composite State, of collective sovereignty, etc., do not fall
to be considered here and do not, for that matter, throw any doubt upon
the principle which has just been enunciated. Under this reservation it
may be stated that territorial sovereignty belongs always to one, or in exceptional circumstances to several States, to the exclusion of all others.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

178

VILLANOVA ILAW REVIEw

[Vol. 56: p. 163

The Supreme Court has recognized this principle since America's infancy. 5 6 Unwaveringly, the Court has continued to rely upon this notion
when asked to balance the proper application of U.S. law with the nation's
international obligations.'
Notwithstanding this appreciation, applying
U.S. law abroad should not depend on judicial interpretations of foreign
policy concerns. 5 8 Rather, comity of nations may be properly realized
through the cooperative regulatory efforts alluded to above, or by simply
moderating the current U.S. reach abroad.5 9 As shown below, the latter
The fact that the functions of a State can be performed by any State
within a given zone is, on the other hand, precisely the characteristic feature of the legal situation pertaining in those parts of the globe which,
like the high seas or lands without a master, cannot or do not yet form
the territory of a State.
Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb.

1928).
56. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007)
(holding that U.S. patent law does not have extraterritorial application by relying
on "presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the

world" and finding that foreign policy judgments are implicated); M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("We cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by
our laws, and resolved in our courts."); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)
(holding that "[n]o law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived," and that "'the comity of nations"'
defines scope of such sovereignty); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations . . . ."); Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 117 (1779) (equating "independency and inviolability" of foreign minister to "immunities of his house," and holding that "to
invade [a State's] freedom is a crime against the State and all other nations"); cf
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) ("If the
United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords and have a
role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate international agreements.").
57. See Lauitzen, 345 U.S. at 578-79 (noting that issue of statutory construction in case is "rather commonplace in a federal system by which courts often have
to decide whether 'any' or 'every' reaches to the limits of the enacting authority's
usual scope or is to be applied to foreign events or transactions").
58. See Chang, supra note 44, at 107 ("The problem here is that the antifraud
provisions are applied by the courts on an ad hoc judicial decision-making basis,
not by clear rules that the legislative or executive branches have formulated.");
Matson, supra note 4, at 165 ("Not only is it inappropriate for United States courts
to determine the policies of other sovereign nations, but courts are also singularly
ill-suited to weigh the delicate political and practical concerns affecting this policy
judgment."); Testy, supra note 9, at 958 (arguing that formulation of policy with
regard to "subject matter jurisdiction over transnational transactions" is best left
with legislative and executive branches, because "institutional constraints" make
courts "ill-suited" to address foreign policy concerns).
59. See, Choi & Silberman, supra note 44, at 502-03 ("A rule based on the
regulatory authority of a country over its securities-market would limit the United
States to applying the securities laws where it has the power to enforce its laws.");
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approach proves viable after Morrison and the Dodd-Frank Act's failure to
overturn it.6 0
III.

GETTING THE BALL ROLLING: THE MORRISON DECISION LIMITS
FOREIGN PRIVATE RIGHTS OF AcTION UNDER
THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS

In Morrison, the Supreme Court overruled lower court case law that
applied the conduct and effects tests.6 1 The Court held that these courts
erred by making determinations of what Congress would have intended
Section 10(b) to govern, rather than applying the statutory presumption
against extraterritoriality. 62 Finding no language in the Exchange Act to
rebut this presumption, the Court held that Section 10(b) applies only to
transactions involving a security listed on any U.S. exchange, or domestic
63
transactions involving any other security.
A.

A Brief Synopsis of the Conduct and Effects Tests

In holding that the Exchange Act does not have foreign application,
the Morrison Court expressly rejected the conduct and effects tests that
developed in the lower courts. 64 The Second Circuit first adopted the effects test governing subject-matter jurisdiction over violations of the Exchange Act in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.65 In that case, the court held that
the impaired value of domestic investments through fraudulent conduct
committed by foreign issuers had "a sufficiently serious effect upon United
States commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction." 6 6 The inquiry
under this effects test, later clarified by the same court, is "whether the
Kelly, supra note 2, at 500 (concluding that "domestic-traded" test, what Supreme
Court termed transactional test, promotes comity interests by "defer[ring] jurisdiction to the country with the greatest interest" and respecting foreign policy
judgments).
60. For a discussion of the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 after Morrison and the Dodd-Frank Act, see infra notes 136-62 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
62. See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) ("The results of judicial-speculation-made-law-divining what Congress would have wanted
if it had thought of the situation before the court-demonstrate the wisdom of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.").
63. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
64. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-81 (holding that "judicial-speculation-madelaw" embodied in conduct and effects tests fails to properly recognize presumption
against extraterritoriality).
65. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. In Schoenbaum, investors of a Canadian corporation, listing its stock on the New York Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock
Exchange, brought suit claiming the corporation and its directors fraudulently
withheld information "in order to purchase [] treasury shares at an artificially low
market price." Id. at 204-05.
66. Id. at 208-09 (citations omitted); see id. at 208 (holding that subject-matter
jurisdiction over defendants existed, even though alleged fraudulent transactions
took place abroad, "when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a
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wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon
United States citizens."6 7 An effect is not substantial "when predominantly
foreign-based fraud only tangentially impacts the United States market,
such as by affecting general investor confidence."6 8
The conduct test, first adopted by the Second Circuit in Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,6 9 focuses on conduct within the

United States and the harm it causes to investors abroad rather than the
effects of foreign conduct on domestic markets and investors. 70 Subjectmatter jurisdiction exists under this test "if the defendant's conduct in the
United States was more than merely preparatory to the fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act within the United States directly caused
losses to foreign investors abroad." 7 The "critical factor" in this assessment is that the conduct that "directly caused the loss to investors" occurred in the United States. 72
national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American investors" (citations omitted)).
67. SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled by Morrison, 130
S. Ct. 2869.
68. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Secs. Litig., No. 03-6537, 2006 WL 3844465, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006); accord Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989
(2d Cir. 1975) (holding effects test is satisfied "only when [fraudulent acts relating
to securities] result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom
the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse affect on
the American economy or American investors generally" (footnote omitted)), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; In re SCOR Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F.
Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting "focus of the effects test on concrete
harm to U.S. investors and markets").
69. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
70. See id. at 1333-34 (differentiating between circumstances in case before
court from those in Schoenbaum, and determining that "when no fraud has been
practiced in this country and the purchase or sale has not been made here, we
would be hard pressed to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum"). In
Leasco, the court concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim against a British corporation and its executives, even though the corporation's stock was listed and purchased only on the London Stock Exchange,
because "there were abundant misrepresentations in the United States." Id. at
1334-35. The court based its holding on the determination that "[s]ince Congress
[ ] meant

§

10(b) to protect against fraud in the sale or purchase of securities

whether or not these were traded on organized United States markets, we cannot
perceive any reason why it should have wished to limit the protection to securities
of American issuers." Id. at 1336.
71. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Psimenos v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir.1983)), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
2869; accord North South Finance Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that focus of conduct test is on how U.S.-based conduct "relates to
the alleged fraudulent scheme, 'on the theory that Congress did not want to allow
the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners.'" (quoting Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1045) (internal quotation omitted)), overruled by Morrison, 130 S.
Ct. 2869.
72. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing
Second Circuit's holding in Berger, 322 F.3d 187), affd and overruled by Morrison, 130
S. Ct. 2869.
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The Second Circuit later blended these two tests into a single inquiry,
reasoning that "an admixture or combination of the two often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court."73 Other circuits
created their own tests, based predominantly on the Second Circuit's reasoning, but diverging in certain respects. 74 These developments contributed to the lack of clarity that commentators have long recognized among
the interpretations of securities laws, and that the Supreme Court finally
remedied in Morrison.7 5
B.

The Facts of Morrison

In 1998, Australia-based National Australia Bank (NAB) acquired
Florida-based HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide). 76 HomeSide operated by collecting fees for servicing mortgages.77 The company would
compute the present value of its rights to such mortgage servicing fees at
the beginning of each year and list these rights as an asset on its balance
73. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995), overruled by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
74. See U.S. Supreme Court Greatly Restricts ExtraterritorialApplication Of Civil Securities Fraud Actions, SKADDEN, ARPs, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES
MEMORANDUM (July 19, 2010), available at http://www.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications2ll2_O.pdf (stating that number of circuit courts of appeals
issued interpretations of whether Section 10(b) had extraterritorial application,
"each with varying results that district courts recognized became a difficult and
amorphous standard to apply" and that the Morrison decision "provide[s] clarity
where it was very much needed"); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 ("While applying the same fundamental methodology of balancing interests and arriving at what
seemed the best policy, [the other circuit courts using the Second Circuit's approach] produced a proliferation of vaguely related variations on the 'conduct'
and 'effects' tests."). See generallyJonathan Wang, Note, SecuritiesPirates: Why a More
Expansive Basis for Jurisdiction Over Transnational Securities Fraud Will Prevent the
United States From TurningInto the Barbary Coast, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 223, 229-32, 239
(2010) (examining different approaches to conduct test taken by U.S. circuit
courts of appeals and discussing its inconsistent application).
75. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 44, at 108 (noting that "each court has had to
struggle with the difficult issue of the extraterritoriality of securities laws without
congressional guidance, expanding or limiting its jurisdictional coverage according to its individual whims," which has resulted in inconsistent applications of tests
and in courts tending to give statute overbroad applications); Choi & Silberman,

supra note 44, at 467 ("The individual doctrines applied within the courts-such as
the conduct and effects tests-are often ambiguous and difficult to predict.");
White, supra note 38, at 114 (noting "inconsistent application of judicially-crafted
solutions in determining whether to apply U.S. securities laws to foreign-cubed
class actions"); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 ("As they developed, [the conduct and effects] tests were not easy to administer.").
76. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875 (noting that NAB, Australia's largest bank,
purchased mortgage servicing company, Homeside).
77. See id. ("HomeSide's business was to receive fees for servicing mortgages
(essentially the administrative tasks associated with collecting mortgage payments).

The rights to receive those fees, so-called mortgage-servicing rights, can provide a
valuable income stream." (citations omitted)).
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sheets. 7 8 To this end, the company's success depended largely on the

state of the housing market and, thus, on interest rates.79 Between 1998
and 2001, HomeSide and NAB's reported profits predominantly reflected
the calculations of servicing rights from HomeSide's valuation models.80
In July 2001 and September 2001, NAB announced two write-downs of
Homeside's assets totaling $2.25 billion. 8 1 Accordingly, the value of the
NAB's ordinary shares and American Depositary Receipts dropped. 2 In
response to the write downs, NAB cited "a failure to anticipate the lowering of prevailing interest rates,

. . .

other mistaken assumptions in the fi-

nancial models, and the loss of goodwill." 8 3
Australian investors in NAB's ordinary shares filed suit against NAB
and HomeSide in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 84 The investors claimed that NAB, HomeSide, and relevant executives of each entity, fraudulently manipulated the forecasting
78. See id. (stating that right to mortgage servicing fees proves to be "a valuable income stream").
79. See id. (noting that value of rights is dependent upon "the likelihood that
the mortgage to which it applies will be fully repaid before it is due;" additionally,
ability to repay depends on current interest rates).
80. See id. (stating that NAB touted success of business through annual reports, other public documents, and public statements by directors and officers).
81. See id. at 2875-76 ("[O]n July 5, 2001, National announced that it was writing down the value of HomeSide's assets by $450 million; and then again on September 3, by another $1.75 billion.").
82. See id. at 2876 (noting "slump[ ]" in prices). Ordinary shares are "what in
America would be called 'common stock."' Id. at 2875. The SEC defines American Depository Receipts:
The stocks of most foreign companies that trade in the U.S. markets are
traded as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). U.S. depositary banks
issue these stocks. Each ADR represents one or more shares of foreign
stock or a fraction of a share. If you own an ADR, you have the right to
obtain the foreign stock it represents, but U.S. investors usually find it
more convenient to own the ADR. The price of an ADR corresponds to
the price of the foreign stock in its home market, adjusted to the ratio of
the ADRs to foreign company shares.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, Amenrican Depositary Receipts (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.
sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm.
83. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
84. See id. (noting that investors purchased NAB ADRs before write-downsin 2000 and 2001); see also id. at 2876 n.1 ("Robert Morrison, an American investor
in National's ADRs, also brought suit, but his claims were dismissed by the District
Court because he failed to allege damages." (citation omitted)).
The Mornison case is an example of what has been termed an "F-cubed" or
"foreign-cubed" case. Cf id. at 2894 n.1 1 (Stevens,J., concurring in result) (noting
that "foreign-cubed actions" would also be categorically excluded from Section
10(b) application under Second Circuit approach). Such a case has been defined
as a "securities fraud case involving a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign company
with regard to shares of that company purchased on a foreign securities exchange." Ronald J. Colombo, Morrison v. National Australia Bank-Post-Decision
SCOTUScast, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.fed-soc.org/audioLib/SCOTUScast-08-19-10-Colombo%28001%29.mp3.
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models for their mortgage servicing rights. 8 5 By knowingly reporting continued revenues based on those rights through financial statements and
press releases, the complaint alleged, the defendants' actions violated Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 8 6 The district court dismissed the claims for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that NAB's conduct in the
United States was insufficient to establish jurisdiction and did not cause
the plaintiffs' harm. 8 7 The Second Circuit affirmed on appeal.8 8
C.

The Court Resurrects the Long Lost Statutory Presumption

In Morrison, the Supreme Court revived the statutory presumption
that the Second Circuit neglected in developing its conduct and effects
tests. 8 9 The Court, withJustice Scalia writing for the majority, emphasized
85. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 (stating that suit alleged violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
86. See id. (noting that plaintiffs claimed defendants "violat[ed] §§ 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to § 10(b)" (citations omitted)).
87. See In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Secs. Litig., No. 03-6537, 2006 WL 3844465, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (applying Second Circuit's conduct and effects tests in
holding that "[o]n balance, it is the foreign acts-not any domestic ones-that
'directly caused' the alleged harm here" (citation omitted)).
88. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
that court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction due to "particular mix of factors-the
fact that the fraudulent statements at issue emanated from NAB's corporate headquarters in Australia, the complete lack of any effect on America or Americans,
and the lengthy chain of causation between HomeSide's actions and the statements that reached investors"), affd in part and overruled in part by Morrison, 130 S.
Ct. at 2869.
89. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (noting disregard among Second Circuit
and other lower courts of statutory presumption against extraterritorial application). The Second Circuit did address this presumption in its earlier cases. In
Schoenbaum, for example, the court reversed the district court's determination that
subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist because of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. Instead, it held that "Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial
application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market
from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities." Id. In
doing so, the court actually flipped the presumption into one favoring extraterritorial application, reasoning that "[i]f § 30(b) had been meant to exempt every
transaction by any person outside of the United States it would have been drafted
to state that the Act does not apply to 'any transaction in any security outside the
jurisdiction of the United States,' a phrase used in § 30(a)." Id. The court went on
to conclude that, rather than presuming the Act does not apply outside the United
States, "the presumption must be that the Act was meant to apply to those foreign
transactions not specifically exempted." Id. From this analysis, the judicial creations of the conduct and effects tests came to life. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879
("As long as there was prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate, the Second Circuit explained, whether to apply § 10(b) even to 'predominantly foreign' transactions
became a matter of whether a court thought Congress 'wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to
them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries.'" (citing Bersch v. Drexel
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the "'longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 9 0 Recognizing that Congress generally legislates only with concern for domestic matters,9 1 the Court held
that "'unless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a statute extraterritorial effect, 'we must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.' "92 The majority reasoned
that the purpose of the presumption is to avoid exactly that which became
the underlying inquiry of the judicially-created conduct and effects testsascertaining what legislators had in mind when enacting the statute.9 3
Thus, as the Court explained, "[w] hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none."94 With this conclusion
established, the Court proceeded to analyze whether the language of the
95
Exchange Act provides for extraterritorial application of its provisions.
Here, the Court addressed three contentions regarding the Exchange
Act's language and concluded that none of the proffered provisions evidenced congressional intent to have Section 10(b) apply outside the
United States. 96
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct.

2869; IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869)).
90. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See id. ("Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters." (citing Smith v. U.S., 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993))).
92. Id. (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. See id. at 2881 ("The results of judicial-speculation-made-law-divining
what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the
court-demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality.");
see also id. at 2880 n.4 (dismissing Judge Stevens' reliance in concurrence on conduct and effects tests from Second Circuit). The Court noted the "judicial oak"
that grew from a "legislative acorn" in Rule 1Ob-5 actions, and thatJudge Friendly
of the Second Circuit was its "master arborist." Id. (quoting id. at 2888-89 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)). Nevertheless, the majority stated that "|judge
Friendly's] successors, though perhaps under the impression that they nurture the
same mighty oak, are in reality tending each its own botanically distinct tree." Id.
94. Id. at 2878.
95. See id. at 2882-83 (shifting analysis to extraterritorial reach of provisions).
96. See id. The first contention was that the use of the term "interstate com-

merce" in Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act indicates an intention to have the act

apply abroad. Id. at 2882. "Interstate commerce" is defined as "trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication ... between any foreign country and any State."
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (2006), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Court dismissed this argument, holding that "the general reference to foreign commerce in the definition of 'interstate commerce'
does not defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality." Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2882 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 251).
The second contention pointed to one of the stated purposes of the Exchange
Act that provides in part, "prices established and offered in such transactions are
generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign
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No "Craven Watchdog" Here: The New Transactional Test Governing

§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Claims
After resolving the presumption question, the Court turned its examination to the petitioners' contention that they should succeed on their
claims even if Section 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially.9 7 Specifically, the petitioners argued that the violation at issue was HomeSide's
fraudulent reporting, a domestic activity requiring exclusively domestic application of the Exchange Act.98 The Court, however, only briefly addressed this argument, stating that, given the rarity of a case in which no
domestic activity could be alleged, "the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its
99
kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case."
The majority opinion then drew the significant distinction between

"deceptive conduct 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered"' and mere deceptive conduct.10 0 Employing this distinction, the
countries." 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2006), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (presenting
argument). The Court quickly rejected this argument by looking to the qualifying
language prior to "such transactions," which states that "'transactions in securities
as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets
are affected with a national public interest.'" Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78b). The Court held that, because "[n]othing suggests that this national public interest pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges
and markets," this "fleeting reference" fails to overcome the presumption. Id.
The petitioners' third contention involved Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act,
and argued that its language indicates an exception to the general understanding
that the Exchange Act applies abroad. Id. Under Section 30(b), the Court stated,
"'The provisions of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States,' unless he does so in violation of regulations
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission "to prevent .. . evasion
of [the Act].' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2006), amended by Dodd-Frank
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)) (brackets in original). The Court
concluded that Section 30(b) seemed more likely to be a type of catch-all provision
to prevent domestic violations going unpunished due to some minor foreign conduct. Id. at 2882-83. "At most," the Court stated, "the . . . proposed inference is
possible; but possible interpretations of statutory language do not override the presumption against extraterritoriality." Id. at 2883 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253);
see id. (rejecting argument in concurrence accusing majority of considering presumption against extraterritoriality "clear statement rule," and simply holding that
"there is no clear indication of extraterritoriality here").
97. Id. at 2883-84 ("Petitioners argue that the conclusion that § 10(b) does
not apply extraterritorially does not resolve this case.").
98. Id. ("[The petitioners] contend that they seek no more than domestic
application anyway, since Florida is where HomeSide and its senior executives engaged in the deceptive conduct of manipulating HomeSide's financial models;
their complaint also alleged that [Homeside executives] made misleading public
statements there.").
99. Id. at 2884.
100. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) and citing SEC v. Zandford, 535
U.S. 813, 820 (2002)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

186

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw

[Vol. 56: p. 163

Court determined that the Exchange Act focuses upon transactions of securities in the United States rather than where the fraudulent conduct
originated.10 1 Thus, Section 10(b) only applies to transactions involving a
security listed on a domestic exchange, or domestic transactions involving
any other security.' 0 2 Consequently, under this standard, the petitioners
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the Court
03
dismissed the case accordingly.
This bright-line rule provides greater certainty and guidance with respect to the protection afforded investors and the potential liability for
issuers, as evidenced by district courts' applications of the Morrisonholding
to date. 0 4 The decision has also reversed the recent trend of increased
101. See id. ("[W]e think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the
place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities
in the United States.").
102. See id. ("[I]t is in our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies."). The Court reasoned that, "[w]ith regard to securities not registered on
domestic exchanges, the exclusive focus on domestic purchases and sales is strongly
confirmed by § 30(a) and (b), discussed earlier." Id. at 2885 (footnote omitted).
Additionally, the Court looked to the Securities Act of 1933, which was "enacted by
the same Congress as the Exchange Act, and form[ed] part of the same comprehensive regulation of securities trading," and concluded the SEC interpreted the
statute's registration requirement for sales of securities as inapplicable to sales occurring outside the U.S. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2009)); see id. ("[The Securities Act of 1933] makes it unlawful to sell a security, through a prospectus or
otherwise, making use of 'any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails,' unless a registration statement is
in effect." (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1) (2006), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010))).
103. See id. at 2888 ("This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners who
still have live claims occurred outside the United States."). Lastly, the Court voiced
its comity concerns in stating, "[t] he probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign
application 'it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and
procedures.'" Id. (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991)).
104. See, e.g., Cedefio v. Intech Group, Inc., No. 09-9716, 2010 WL 3359468 at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2010) (applying Morrison Court's analysis in holding RICO
statute "does not apply where, as here, the alleged enterprise and the impact of the
predicate activity upon it are entirely foreign," because "RICO evidences no concern with foreign enterprises"); In re Banco Santander Securities-Optimal Litigation, Nos. 09-MD-02073-CIV, 09-CV-20215-CIV., 2010 WL 3036990 at *5 (S.D. Fla.
July 30, 2010) (holding that Morrison'stransaction test is not satisfied where plaintiffs "made off-shore purchases in off-shore Bahamian investment funds closed to
United States investors"); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, No. 08-3758, 2010 WL
3069597 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.July 27, 2010) (rejecting plaintiffs arguments that Morrison
decision is limited to circumstances involving "F-cubed" claims, because "the Morrison opinions indicate that the Court considered that under its new test § 10(b)
would not extend to foreign securities trades executed on foreign exchanges even
if purchased or sold by American investors, and even if some aspects of the transaction occurred in the United States"); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10-922,
2010 WL 3377409 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (holding that Morrison's transactional
test is not satisfied when "purchaser or seller resides in the United States and completes a transaction on a foreign exchange from the United States," because "[t]he
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litigation aimed at foreign issuers as it retracts the reach of U.S. securities
law in private rights of action.1 0 5 Moreover, Morrison will likely serve to
lessen the discord between the United States and other nations with equal
interests in regulating securities fraud.10 6

IV.

THE

NEw

FRAUD LAWS OF THE LAND: ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
IN THE DODD-FRANK

Acr

The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted on July 21, 2010, "[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices, and for other purposes."10 7 The relevant antifraud provisions governing claims under the U.S. securities laws are sections 929P(b) and 929Y. 0 8 Under section 929P(b), entitled
"Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws," Congress grants U.S. district courts subject-matter jurisdiction over enforcement actions by the SEC or the United States pursuant to
the antifraud provisions of the securities law under the conduct and ef-

fects tests.10 9 Congress did not speak to the extraterritorial application of
the antifraud provisions with respect to private rights of action under the
Supreme Court emphasized that the Exchange Act was not intended to regulate
foreign exchanges"); see also Cave, supranote 3 ("[T]he [Morrison] Court's decision
will impact in (sic) the numerous F-cubed cases pending throughout the federal
courts" and citing, as an example, In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation,
No. 02-5571, 2009 WL 3859066 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009), in which three quarters
of class of plaintiffs were foreign).
105. See Cave, supra note 3 (noting that potential for liability stemming from
application of U.S. law to foreign companies will decrease after Morrison); Himes,
supranote 2 (concluding that "Morrison will put the brakes on" extraterritorial expansion of Section 10(b) claims).
106. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (rationalizing holding by noting that "the
regulation of other countries often differs from ours as to what constitutes fraud,
what disclosures must be made, what damages are recoverable, what discovery is
available in litigation, what individual actions may be joined in a single suit, what
attorney's fees are recoverable, and many other matters"); Himes, supra note 2
("[T]he Supreme Court's opinion can be seen as advancing globalization of the
securities markets by constricting application of U.S. law in the recognition that
other countries will apply their own securities regulation to overseas capital-raising
activity.").

107. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
108. See Conway, supra note 11 ("The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act . .. contains two provisions, Sections 929P(b) and 929Y,
that concern the territorial scope of the federal securities laws."); Investor Protection
and SEC Enforcement: Skadden Commentary on the Dodd-Frank Act, SKADDEN, ARPs,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFIUATEs NEWSLETTERS 2 nn.5-7 (July 9, 2010),
http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/FSR

InvestorProtection-andSEC-En-

forcement.pdf (same).
109. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864-65.
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federal securities laws, however, thereby deferring to the Morrisondecision
until the SEC submits a report on the issue. 110
V. PERHAPS Too MANY ALL-NIGHTERS: A DRAFTING ERROR IN THE
FRANK AcT SIGNALS AN INADVERTENT "THUMBS Up" By
CONGRESS TO THE MORRISON COURT

DODD-

Despite the anticipation and excitement that accompanied the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the language of the Act's provisions governing extraterritorial application seemingly fails to capture the drafters'
intent."II While debating the Dodd-Frank Act on the House floor, Representative Paul Kanjorski, one of the leaders in drafting the legislation, asserted that the object of section 929P(b) is to specifically rebut the
presumption against extraterritorial application. 112 Representative
Kanjorski further indicated that the Act aimed to confer extraterritorial
application to U.S. securities laws in actions brought by the SEC or the
DOJ." 3 Nevertheless, the language in the final draft of the legislation,
passed by Congress the day after the Morrison decision, lacked the clarity
and force of law that Representative Kanjorski envisioned because section
929P(b) ultimately took the form of a jurisdictional statute granting federal district courts subject-matter jurisdiction over such SEC and DOJ
actions.114
A.

jurisdictionalStatutes: Sifting Through Their "Many Meanings"

The Supreme Court has aptly stated that "'U] urisdiction . .. is a word
of many, too many, meanings.' "115 With respect to jurisdictional statutes,

the Court has held that they only speak to the power of courts to hear a
case, as opposed to defining a party's rights or obligations."16 This line of
110. Id. § 929Y, 124 Stat. at 1871.
111. See Conway, supra note 11 (noting that language of section 929P (b) does
not reflect intentions indicated during debate on House floor).
112. See 156 CONG. REC. H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Kanjorski) ("This bill's provisions concerning extraterritoriality [ ] are intended to
rebut th[e] presumption [against extraterritorial application] by clearly indicating
that Congress intends extraterritorial application in cases brought by the SEC or
the Justice Department."); see also 156 CONG. REc. H5235 (daily ed.June 30, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Frank) (identifying Rep. Kanjorski as leader in drafting of Act).
113. See id. ("Thus, the purpose of the language of section 929P(b) of the bill
is to make clear that in actions and proceedings brought by the SEC or the Justice
Department, the specified provisions of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and
the Investment Advisers Act may have extraterritorial application . . . .").
114. See Conway, supranote 11 (noting that "the territorial scope of a federal
law" is issue of "substance" and not jurisdiction and that drafters made "crucial,
and likely fatal" error).
115. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
116. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)
("[J]urisdictional statutes 'speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights
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reasoning-distinguishing between the substance of a statute imposing
certain obligations or granting certain rights and the power of a court to
hear a case concerning such substance-is consistent across the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. 117 Debate, however, stems from the distinction between the principles of 'jurisdiction to adjudicate" and "jurisdiction to
prescribe."1 18 Congress's authority to grant jurisdiction does not rest
solely upon the theory of jurisdiction to adjudicate. 11 9 Apart from this
authority, Congress may also define the extraterritorial reach of its legislation by way of jurisdiction to prescribe, otherwise known as "legislative jurisdiction."12 0 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law defines this
concept in terms of Congress's authority "to make its law applicable to the
activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in
things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative
rule or regulation, or by determination of a court."12 1 Interpreting a
given statute to determine its extraterritorial reach requires a careful consideration of both concepts, as "it would be .. . erroneous to assume that
or obligations of the parties.'" (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United
States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (ThomasJ., concurring))). It has even been argued that jurisdictional statutes do not compel a court to hear a case pursuant to
the statute at issue, but only authorize a court to do so. See David L. Shapiro,
jurisdiction and Discretion,60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 574-75 (1985) ("[A] grant ofjurisdiction should normally be (and indeed generally has been) read as an authorization to the court to entertain an action but not as an inexorable command.").
117. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-14 (2004) (noting
that "[a]s enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts 'cognizance' of certain
causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold
substantive law" (citation omitted)); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 820 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "Court's comity analysis" is
"misdirected," because it "proceeds as though the issue is whether the courts
should 'decline to exercise ... jurisdiction' . . . rather than whether the Sherman
Act covers this conduct" (citation omitted)). Justice Scalia continued to note that
"the parties did not make a clear distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and
the scope of the statute." Id.
118. See Erez Reuveni, Extraterritorialityas Standing: A Standing Theory of the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1071, 1096-1103
(2010) (discussing distinction between legislative and subject-matter jurisdiction);
see also Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman & Keith A. Rowley, Forum Non Conveniens in
Federal Statutory Cases, 49 EMORY L.J. 1137, 1191-93 (2000) (explaining how courts
may not dismiss action in response to Rule 12(b) (1) motion when statute at issue
grants court power to hear case, but same court may grant Rule 12(b) (6) motion
for failure to state claim under same statute if court determines statute was not
intended to provide right of recovery).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw § 401(a)-(b) (1987)
(defining "jurisdiction to prescribe" in terms of Congress' authority "to make its
law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of
persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court").
120. Id. § 401(b); see HartfordFire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part) (noting that "[legislative jurisdiction] is quite a separate matter from 'jurisdiction to adjudicate"' (citation omitted)).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw
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12 2
Althe legislature always means to go to the full extent permitted."
though many early cases failed to recognize this guiding principle, the
12 3
This
Supreme Court has reemphasized the distinction more recently.
the
extraterritorial
clear
that
makes
discussed
below,
recentjurisprudence,
application of federal law is not an issue of subject-matterjurisdiction (i.e.,
jurisdiction to adjudicate), but rather an issue of statutory interpretation
in determining whether Congress exercised its legislative jurisdiction (i.e.,
24
jurisdiction to prescribe) in enacting that law.1

In Landgrafv. USI Film Products,12 5 the Court looked to its tradition of
"appl[ying] intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction" to determine if Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied retroactively.' 2 6 It noted that the " [a]pplication of a new jurisdictional rule
usually 'takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal
that is to hear the case."' 1 27 Under this rationale, the Court held that
jurisdictional statutes such as Section 102 have no retroactive effect, because they "'speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or
28
obligations of the parties.""
122. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972), overruled by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
123. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869 (noting that mistake of failing to distinguish between subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction to prescribe claim for
relief had been made before (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1968), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2869; In reCP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009), overruled
by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869; Cont'l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511
(2006) (addressing need to be more "meticulous" regarding "subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy"); Reuveni, supra note 119, at
1101 (discussing history of how early case law "conflate[d] the concept of legislative jurisdiction with the court's power to adjudicate" and only analyzed issue of
extraterritoriality "as a question of subject matter jurisdiction").
124. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 ("[Subject-matter jurisdiction]
presents an issue quite separate from the question whether the allegations the
plaintiff makes entitle him to relief."); Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 813-14
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that interpretation of Sherman's Act extraterritorial reach "has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts," but rather
is question of whether Congress has exercised its "legislative jurisdiction in enacting the Sherman Act"); Reuveni, supra note 119, at 1102 (concluding that "the
extraterritorial scope of federal law is not properly deemed a question of subject
matterjurisdiction," but "question [of] whether and to what extent Congress exercised its legislative jurisdiction"); cf Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
455-56 (2007) (addressing extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law as issue of statutory interpretation of Congress' authority rather than issue of subject-matter jurisdiction); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
(discussing same with respect to antitrust laws).
125. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
126. Id. at 274.
127. Id. (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
128. Id. (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80,
100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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The LandgrafCourt's interpretation was reaffirmed in Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. United States.' 29 In Hughes Aircraft, the Court declared that
"[s] tatutes merely addressing which court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a particular cause of action can fairly be said merely to regulate the
secondary conduct of litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of
the parties."130 It went on to hold that these jurisdictional "statutes affect
31
only where a suit may be brought, not whether it may be brought at all."'
Most recently, in Morrison, the Court highlighted this distinction at
the outset of its analysis, stating, "[subject-matter jurisdiction] presents an
issue quite separate from the question whether the allegations the plaintiff
makes entitle him to relief."1 3 2 According to the Court, the district court
had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Exchange Act and, therefore,
1 33
Instead, the
should not have dismissed the case for lack ofjurisdiction.
a claim,
to
state
for
failure
case
the
dismissed
have
lower court should
quesa
merits
is
prohibits
10(b)
because the issue of what conduct Section
34
the
after
Only
a
case.'
hear
to
power
court's
tion-not a question of a
the
of
the
language
to
analyze
proceed
did
it
Court drew this distinction
jurisits
legislative
exercised
Congress
whether
to
determine
Exchange Act
35
diction to have Section 10(b) apply abroad.
B.

Section 929P(b) Unmasked: Little Bite to Congress'sExtraterritorialBark

Due to the limited nature of jurisdictional statutes, it seems that the
extent of the powers granted by Section 929P(b) ends with a federal dis129. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
130. Id. at 951.
131. Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994); Landgraf 511 U.S. at 291 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
132. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (citing Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
133. See id. at 2877 ("The District Court here hadjurisdiction under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa to adjudicate the question whether § 10(b) applies to National's conduct.").
Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. §78aa (1996), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010).
134. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 ("[T]o ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches
is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question.").
135. By doing so, the majority properly followed Supreme Court precedent.
See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (framing issue as whether Congress exercised its legislative jurisdiction to have Title VII protections apply abroad, and then
analyzing issue under principle "'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States'" (citation omitted)); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85
(1949) (addressing same with respect to Eight Hour Law).
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trict court's power to hear the case.'e While such courts may entertain
SEC and DOJ enforcement actions under Section 929P(b), the ability of
these agencies to enforce the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities
laws is no clearer than it was prior to the Dodd-Frank Act's enactment.1 3 7
Consequently, despite the drafters' intentions to the contrary, the presumption against extraterritorial application of the provision is not overcome by the Act's provisions. 13 8
The issue of whether Congress exercised its legislative jurisdiction in
allowing Section 10(b) to apply abroad should, arguably, be considered
res judicata.13 9 The Morrison decision analyzes the language of the Exchange Act, and, realizing the foreign interests at stake, appropriately subjected it to time-tested canons of construction. 140 The natural response to
this conclusion is that the Dodd-Frank Act's amendatory language requires a new inquiry and reveals a clear intention to give Section 10(b)
extraterritorial application with respect to SEC and DOJ enforcement actions.14 1 Lower courts, if faced with this argument, should adopt the Morrison test governing foreign application because it properly defers to
foreign regulation of securities markets.1 42
Notwithstanding the subjective intent of various legislators regarding
foreign application, Congress's drafting error in Section 929P(b) still
proves fatal under any new inquiry.' 4 3 Indeed, the provision addresses
136. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 274 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[J]urisdictional
statutes 'speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of
the parties'" (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. U.S., 506 U.S. 80, 100
(1992)); Conway, supra note 11 (explaining that Section 929P(b) "unambiguously
addresses only the 'jurisdiction'of the 'district courts of the United States' to hear
cases involving extraterritorial elements; its language clearly does not expand the
geographic scope of any substantive regulatory provision").
137. See Conway, supranote 11 ("The new law does not .. . expand the territo-

rial scope of the government's enforcement powers at all.").
138. Cf Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (holding that even

though Federal Tort Claims Act "specifically addresses the issue of extraterritorial
application in the foreign-country exception," lack of clear indication of congressional intent fails to defeat presumption).
139. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 ("[T]here is no affirmative indication in
the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.").
140. See id. at 2877-83 (applying presumption against extraterritoriality to Exchange Act, and determining whether statutory language defeats presumption).
141. See id. at 2883 (noting that presumption is not "a clear statement rule,"
and stating that "context can be consulted" to determine whether Congress indicated intention to have statute apply abroad).
142. See id. at 2886 (holding that transactional test addresses concerns that
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "interfere[s] with foreign securities regulation").
143. See Conway, supra note 11 ("The new law does not address [the issue of
what conduct is prohibited], and accordingly does not expand the territorial scope
of the government's enforcement powers at all.").
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only the matters over which U.S. district courts "shall have jurisdiction." 44
Under this rationale, the Mornison analysis remains unchanged because
nothing in the statute specifically speaks to the statute's extraterritorial
reach. 14 5 This conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court precedent upholding the presumption against extraterritoriality even though the stat14 6
ute contains references to extraterritorial elements.
Nonetheless, any litigation regarding extraterritorial application
under Section 929P(b) will center around the issue of Congress's intent.147 The strongest arguments in favor of foreign application will be
those positing that the legislative history reveals congressional intent to
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. 148 Litigators will also
likely point to the headings of Section 929P(b) and 929Y-"Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws"
and "Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action," respectively-as
evidence of Congress's intention.1 4 9 Faced with Section 929P(b)'s language regarding the conduct and effects tests and furnished with statements made by the drafters, some lower courts may indeed hold that the
presumption is overcome and apply the provision to foreign SEC and DOJ
actions. 1 50
144. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864-65
(2010).
145. Cf Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-14 (2004) (recognizing

that ATS "gave the district courts 'cognizance' of certain causes of action, and the
term bespoke a grant ofjurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law"); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997) (holding that jurisdictional
"statutes affect only where a suit may be brought, not whether it may be brought at
all" (citations omitted)); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)
("[J]urisdictional statutes 'speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights
or obligations of the parties.'" (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. U.S., 506
U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
146. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) ("The applicability
of the presumption is not defeated here just because the FTCA specifically addresses the issue of extraterritorial application in the foreign-country exception.").
147. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 20 (1963) (holding that National Labor Relations Act does not apply
abroad after finding no contrary indication in "specific language in the Act itself or
in its extensive legislative history that reflects such a congressional intent" (emphasis added)); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1952) (holding that
stated purpose of Lanham Act indicated intent to have statute with broad extraterritorial reach).
148. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) ("The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained."
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
149. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 929P(b), 929Y, 124 Stat. 1376,
1864-65, 1871 (2010).
150. See Conway, supra note 11 (noting that "some judges may be tempted to
find substantive extraterritorial reach in Section 929P(b)"). Notably, this likely
trend among lower courts will put securities fraud jurisprudence in the exact position of uncertainty that the Morrison Court sought to remedy. Cf Morrison v. Nat'l
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Nevertheless, the presumption mentioned above is not the only canon of construction relevant in this analysis, as courts must also recognize
the rule that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."i 5 Indeed,
such a construction is apparent here, for as the Supreme Court aptly
stated in Lamie v. U.S. Trustee,'5 2 "[i]Lt is beyond our province to rescue
Congress from its drafting errors."I5 3 The Lamie Court continued to hold
that "if Congress enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent."I 54
Per Lamie, the legislative history of Section 929P(b) should not even be
considered, for its text is plain and unambiguous.' 5 5 While the majority
in Morrison did note that "context can be consulted" in determining a statute's meaning, it is this author's contention that such context is limited to
the language of the statute.15 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court prohibited
the consideration of titles and headings as they "cannot undo or limit that
which the text makes plain."1 5 7 Because these sections unambiguously fail
to grant extraterritorial jurisdiction to SEC or DOJ actions, their headings
should be disregarded.' 5 8
Thus, while Section 929P(b) need not specifically state that the SEC
and DOJ may apply Section 10(b) extraterritorially in their enforcement
actions, a statute merely granting district courts jurisdiction over such actions in clear and unambiguous terms does not reveal such an intention. 15 9 Adhering to the Morrison test, therefore, will avoid the
interference with foreign securities regulation that international law holds
Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879-81 (2010) (rationalizing overruling of conduct
and effects tests by noting tests' "unpredictable and inconsistent application of
§ 10(b) to transnational cases").
151. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
152. 540 U.S. 526 (2004)
153. Id. at 542 (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989) (holding that Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 does not extend to conduct occurring on "high seas," reasoning that
"[w]hen it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the
jurisdictional reach of a statute").
154. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 542.
155. See id. at 534 ("It is well established that 'when the statute's language is
plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by
the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms.'" (quoting Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000))).
156. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
157. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529
(1947). The Court made clear that "[flor interpretative purposes, [the title of
statute and the heading of a section] are of use only when they shed light on some
ambiguous word or phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution of a
doubt." Id.
158. See Conway, supra note 11 (noting that Sections 929P(b) and 929Y both
fail to extend extraterritorial reach of antifraud provisions).
159. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 ("[W~e do not say, as the concurrence
seems to think, that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a 'clear statement
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the United States accountable for avoiding, and will sufficiently protect
American interests.1 60 Other commentators have concluded that extending jurisdiction beyond legal limits violates international law. 16 ' In
view of this position, the new transactional test set forth in Morrison governing private rights of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should
be extended to govern SEC and DOJ enforcement actions as well, at least
until Congress amends Section 929P(b).162
VI.

THE IMPENDING SIGH OF SECURITIEs

AN

APPEAL TO THE

HuMILrrv:

SEC

Under Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress directs the SEC
to solicit public comment concerning the extraterritorial application of
private rights of action brought pursuant to Rule lOb-5.' 63 With this
charge, the SEC is in a powerful position at a critical time.1 6 4 Section 929Y
provides four factors the SEC should consider in determining whether private rights of action should be extended under the conduct and effects
tests.1 65 For purposes of this Note, the relevant factors are: "(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on international comrule,' if by that is meant a requirement that a statute say 'this law applies abroad.'"
(citation omitted)).
160. See id. at 2886 (holding that transactional test addresses concerns that
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "interfere[s] with foreign securities regulation").
161. See Knox, supranote 55, at 355-56 ("The extension ofjurisdiction beyond
a legal basis for it, or in contravention of a specific legal limit, violates international
law."). For a general discussion of the implications ofjurisdiction in the context of
international law, see CEDRIc RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2008).
162. Cf Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Applicability to SEC of Private
Action Requirements in §10(b) Cases, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11, 2010, at 3 (noting that "[i]t is
difficult to see how the SEC would not have been subject to the Morrison analysis,
absent enactment of Dodd-Frank," but ultimately concluding that Section 929P(b)
expressly grants SEC and DOJ right to enforce under conduct and effects tests);
Himes, supra note 2 (same); Smerek & Hamilton, supra note 23 (same). Contra
Coffee, supra note 23 (concluding that Dodd-Frank Act precludes extension of
Morrison holding to SEC and DOJ enforcement actions); Aliens Arthur Robinson,
supra note 23 (same); Gorman, supra note 23 (same).
163. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929Y, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871
(2010).
164. See Brummer, supranote 1, at 328 ("[T]be SEC is grappling not only with
the question of how to reform its domestic oversight, but also how to export its
preferred safeguards and reforms in a time of declining U.S. economic and financial influence."); cf Conway, supra note 11 (stating that interested parties would be
"behoove [d]" to submit comments to SEC); Himes, supra note 2 (noting that study
under Section 929Y is "sure to generate a robust and multi-faceted study on extraterritoriality for Section 10(b)").
165. See § 929Y, 124 Stat. at 1871 (listing four factors). Discussion regarding
the first factor is beyond the scope of this Article, therefore only factors (2)-(4)
shall be considered. The first factor is "the scope of such a private right of action,
including whether it should extend to all private actors or whether it should be
more limited to extend just to institutional investors or otherwise." Id.
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ity; (3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of
action for transnational securities frauds; and (4) whether a narrower ex16 6
traterritorial standard should be adopted."
The second factor, concerning implications on international comity,
has already been discussed and weighs heavily in favor-if not requires the
recommendation-against adoption of the now-overruled conduct and effects tests.167 The economic implications to be considered under the
third factor have also been well-documented and support a narrower application of the private right of action.1 68 The fourth factor seems to be
1 69
To
merely a request for a conclusion based on the preceding factors.
this end, the SEC should consider its recent actions to curtail the transnational reach of U.S. law, such as the territorial approach adopted in passing Regulation S and Rule 15a-6 with respect to registration
requirements. 170 The SEC should continue this territorial approach in
166. Id. After reviewing these considerations, one cannot help but wonder
what the drafters took into account when composing Section 929P(b), as many of
the issues alluded to are implicated in both private rights of action and government enforcement proceedings. See Himes, supra note 2 (" [W]hile distinctions
exist, a principled basis to differentiate the SEC from a private plaintiff might not
prevail.").
167. See notes 28-57 and accompanying text. It is troubling that Congress defers this analysis to the SEC, considering the rule of construction requiring courts
to "assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of
other nations when they write American laws." See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
168. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313
(2007) ("Private securities fraud actions ... if not adequately contained, can be
employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and individuals
whose conduct conforms to the law."); Howell E.Jackson, Summary ofResearch Findings on Extra-TerritorialApplication of Federal Securities Laws, 1743 PLI/CORP 1243,
1253 (2009) ("What drives foreign firms away from the U.S. capital markets is not
U.S. regulatory compliance but rather the 'fear that listing on a U.S. exchange
exposes the foreign issuer to potentially bankrupting securities liabilities if its stock
price were to decline sharply.'" (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Global Class Actions,
NAT'L L. J., June 11, 2007, at 1)); Patterson, supra note 50, at 235-36 (presenting
argument that broad exercises of U.S. jurisdiction expend more judicial resources,
so "[c]ourts need to be 'concerned to preserve American judicial resources for the
adjudication of domestic disputes and the enforcement of domestic law'" (quoting
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987), overruled by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Foreign Issuers Fear Global Class
Actions, NAT'L L.J., June 14, 2007 ("A series of recent reports by blue-ribbon bodies
have warned that the U.S. capital markets are losing their competitiveness and that
foreign firms fear entering the U.S. market."); see also M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts."). See generally Matson, supra note 4, at 224-28 (discussing economic costs of
extraterritorial application, including negative impact on capital mobility and
therefore less efficient capital allocation).
169. See § 929Y, 124 Stat. at 1871.
170. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 3427942, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (Apr. 24, 1990) (adopting Regulation S and stating that
"[p]rinciples of comity and the reasonable expectations of participants in the
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conducting its study under section 929Y after consideration of the noted
factors and "[t]he SEC's vision . . . to strengthen the integrity and soundness of U.S. securities markets."' 7 ' Thus, the SEC should uphold the Morrison standard governing the extraterritorial application of a Rule 10b-5
implied right of action under Section 10(b), as doing so would constitute
a major step toward reconciling U.S. securities laws with its obligations
under international law.' 72
VII.

CONCLUSION

After Morrison, and pending the SEC's report due to Congress pursuant to Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
apply extraterritorially in private rights of action only to transactions of
securities listed on a U.S. exchange, or to domestic transactions of any
other security.17 3 This transactional test has completely closed off "F-cubed" claims from U.S. litigation.' 7 4 It also overrules the case law advancing the conduct and effects tests and overlooking the lack of legislative
global markets justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the
United States to define requirements for transactions effected offshore" (footnote
omitted)); Chang, supra note 44, at 104-06 (noting that by implementing Regulation S, which exempts foreign issuers from SEC registration requirements, "SEC is
embracing a territorial approach to the extraterritorial application of the Securities Act;" and that "Regulation S also reserves a significant role for itself in bringing
about comity and cooperation among various regulatory regimes in global markets"); Choi & Silberman, supra note 44, at 502-03 (citing Regulation S as example
of U.S. rule limiting U.S. authority to regulate to "where it has the power to enforce its laws," and arguing that Rule lOb-5 should have similar limitation); Kelly,
supra note 2, at 501 (citing Regulation S, "Rule 15a-6, which provides an exemption from the broker-dealer registration requirement for foreign brokers and dealers," and SEC statement regarding "purely territorial approach to section 5 of the
Securities Act" as examples of reforms SEC has made to make rules "limited to
activities within the territory of the United States").
For a thorough discussion of Regulation S, see Jeffry S. Hoffman, Regulation S,
1443 PLI/CoRp 531 (2004); Jaime M. Jackson, Note, "Regulation S" and the TerritorialApproach to Securities Regulation:Are They Effective? A Study of United States Securities Regulation in Light of British and Chinese Securities Regulations, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 613 (2003).
171. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, PurrING INVESTORS FIRST; 2009 PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 6 (2009), http://sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.
pdf (emphasis added).
172. See Himes, supra note 2 (indicating that Morrison decision "minimizes

conflict with other countries over securities transactions" and reduces "interference with their securities regulation caused by application of Section 10(b)
internationally").
173. See § 929Y, 124 Stat. at 1871 (requiring SEC study); Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) ("[I]t is in our view only transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.").
174. See Cave, supra note 3 (noting that under Morrison, Exchange Act does
not provide cause of action for "F-cubed claims"); Himes, supranote 2 (noting that
after Morrison, "F-cubed" claims "should be a thing of the past"); Smerek & Hamil-

ton, supra note 23 (stating that Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially to
"F-cubed" claims after Morrison).
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jurisdiction.1 75 The Dodd-Frank Act fails to properly define the federal
government's powers in applying the U.S. antifraud provisions abroad because it speaks only to the power of the federal district courts to hear such
matters.' 7 6 This drafting error invites increased litigation in these courts
as challenges to SEC and DOJ actions will inevitably arise.' 7 7 Given the
opportunity, lower courts ought to apply the Morrison test for both private
plaintiffs and the federal government when construing the amended language of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.17 8 Such an interpretation
would serve to uphold U.S. obligations under principles of international
law by respecting the sovereignty of nations with their own regulatory
frameworks for securities fraud and whose own markets are primarily affected by such fraud.' 7 9
Andrew Rocks*

175. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 107-62 and accompanying text.
177. See Conway, supra note 11 (concluding that despite drafting error in Sec-

tion 929P(b), "some judges may be tempted to find substantive extraterritorial
reach in Section 929P(b)").
178. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 27-60, 160-62 and accompanying text. It must be stressed
that such an interpretation would not represent an example of ad hoc judicial
lawmaking argued against earlier in this Note. See supra note 56 and accompany-

ing text. Rather, such an analysis is in fact merely recognizing that the moderation
of the United States' reach abroad in the area of securities fraud, as defined by
Morrison's transactional test and Congress's inadvertent deference in the DoddFrank Act, reflects the appropriate basis for jurisdiction under international law.
See generally Knox, supra note 55 (arguing that extraterritorial application of U.S.
law should be based on whether it has "basis" to do so according to international
law).
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this Note, as well as my fellow members of the Villanova Law Review for their
diligent editorial work and support.
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